Arguments Against Moral Pluralism

Moral pluralism is also known as ethical pluralism or value pluralism. Moral pluralism is the idea that there are several values which may be equally correct and fundamental, and yet in conflict with each other. It also postulates that such incompatible values may be incommensurable, in the sense that there is no objective ordering of them in terms of importance. In this essay, I will argue that Moral Pluralism is incorrect because of the objection that it is not consistent with liberalism. I will first discuss some reasons why Moral Pluralism might be an appealing theory. I will then discuss the objections to this theory. I will close by showing examples that support the objection against this theory. Moral pluralism is an alternative to both moral relativism and moral absolutism. An example of moral pluralism is the idea that the moral life of a nun is incompatible with that of a mother, yet there is no purely rational measure of which is preferable. Under moral pluralism, moral

Berlin himself believed that value pluralism was consistent with liberalism, which he understood as a political theory giving great weight to the value of negative liberty. Theorists led by John Gray have argued, however, that Berlin's pluralist stance toward values is not consistent with his commitment to liberalism. Gray's critique has triggered a wide-ranging theoretical debate, and the purpose of this article is to assess that debate. I sketch the essentials of value pluralism and explore its implications for liberal political theory. I conclude that Gray's argument modifies our understanding of liberal democracy but does not drive a wedge between value pluralism and liberal democratic theory. Nevertheless, it underscores the importance of prudence and attention to specific circumstances when using liberal democratic norms to guide the reform of illiberal