Comparing The Challenger And Columbia Space Shuttle Disasters

The fatal space shuttle disasters of 1986 and 2003 are cases that demonstrate the disaster that can occur when organizational risk becomes risker than a technical flaw. The investigations conducted after the incidents revealed the root of the problem as to why these launches failed. The Challenger, and Columbia space missions, two missions seventeen years a part encountered similar issues. Both missions experienced technical flaws, and misaligned organizational structure, and processes. But, it was the organizational structure of NASA that finalized the outcome of these missions, and not the space shuttle’s technical flaws, as it was presumed when the incidents occurred. The cold morning of January 28, 1986 The Challenger was launched; seventy-three seconds later the shuttle exploded, and disintegrated resulting in the death of seven astronauts. Prior to the launch, the mission that was originally planned for January 20th, 1986 experienced technical problems, and bad weather causing several delays. The technical problem of the challenger was an O-ring seal that was located in the right Solid Rocket Booster. O-rings are used to let hot gases through the chamber; due to the cold weather that day the O-ring was not able to act as a

Management used usual rules in places where those rules did not apply, and the organizational structure gave power to those who were under qualified to oversee the operations. The misaligned organizational structure, and processes allowed the risk of the technical flaws to be acceptable. Therefore allowing the issues of the space shuttles to be ignored, and not receiving the proper attention. The ultimate fate of the space shuttles was due to the organization’s risk perception; it was failure to take into account the reality of the risk resulting in the materialization of increased