Effective Law Enforcement System Paper

An effective law enforcement system has adaptability and a checks-and-balances structure. First, an effective law enforcement system is adaptable to the existing and changing cultural norms and crime conditions of the locality; the more local it is, the more it is capable of protecting the safety of the community according to both the law and acceptable social norms. Second, an effective law enforcement system must delineate the roles of the police and the justice system to avoid abuse of power. The definition of effectiveness is based on the success of law enforcement systems in Japan and Saudi Arabia wherein several crime rates are lower than in the U.S., including violent crimes such as murder and homicide, as well as robbery and drug

77). The U.S., a model of Common Law, may have high crime rates but its democratic and transparent criminal justice ideals and systems are considered as better than in Socialist, Civil Law, and Sacred Law families due to the significance given to individual rights and freedoms. The existence of due process, trial by jury, “innocent until proven guilty,” and individual rights and freedoms in the U.S. can help curb police power and corruption. In addition, the states in the U.S. have local jurisdiction in managing everyday law enforcement functions compared to more centralized ones that can delay important decision-making. Adaptability to local conditions enhances the responsiveness and effectiveness of the Common Law’s law enforcement

In China, most of the criminal cases are managed at the county level under the Basic People's Court (Dammer & Albanese, 2014, p. 85). The procuratorate, under the direction of the Supreme People's Procurate, supervises the criminal justice system, throughout China, including investigating and prosecuting crimes and managing the courts, police, and correctional facilities (Dammer & Albanese, 2014, p. 85). This puts the role of the judge and the police in the hands of the same people, making it easy to create decisions that would serve personal interests (Dammer & Albanese, 2014, p. 85). In other words, while the Chinese criminal justice system has a built-in system of checks and balances to prevent power abuses, local procurators approve police arrests and can also decide to do away with the prosecution (Dammer & Albanese, 2014, p. 85). Courts and procurators can collaborate with local political leaders as well to meet the demands of the Communist Party (Dammer & Albanese, 2014, p. 85). Possibly, this can include infringing on individual rights if they conflict with the interests of the Communist state. In addition, local policing can be prone to corruption due to the informal system supplements in China (Dammer & Albanese, 2014, p. 85). A report from the GAN Business