Hegel And Marxism

962 Words4 Pages

There is, however, another significant tradition of linking the anthropological and the political which is exemplified in the works of Hegel and, to some extent, Marx. Hegel's systematic approach allows him to locate a human subject inside of a gradual development of what he calls spirit. Anthropological issues that concern the philosophy of subjective spirit cannot be fully grasped without attending to the objective spirit which refers to the actual expressions of human spirit in the world (for instance, as law, state, or civil society). In Philosophy of Mind Hegel claims that 'I, the infinite relation of me to myself, am as a person the repulsion of me from myself, and have the embodiment of my personality in the being of other person, in …show more content…

To put it another way, subject is placed in the system of the relations of production which have been gradually evolving since the ancient times. Historical materialism occupies a place of the Hegelian philosophy of history. In Manifesto of the Communist Party Marx and Engels argue that the whole history of mankind should be viewed as a developing combat between oppressor and oppressed which 'each time ended, either in a revolutionary re-constitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes' (Marx & Engels 1998, 32). Ultimately, subject is seen as belonging to a certain social camp and representing the actual relations of productions. For Marx and Engels, 'the modern bourgeoisie is itself the product of a long course of development, of a series of revolutions in the modes of production and of exchange' (Marx & Engels 1998, …show more content…

As in Hegel, in Marx and Engels subject is located on the dynamic yet totalizing terrain which determines his or her subjectivation. Nonetheless, in Marx and Engels this terrain can be altered and transcended by coordinated revolutionary action which would open up a space of freedom for subjectivities. However, it is hard to see how the political antagonisms in the Schmittean sense can be effectually resolved and eradicated. Moreover, if we assume, following Aristotle and Arendt, that human being is necessarily defined by the political character of his existence, then any vision of the ultimate cessation of politics appears flawed. At the same time, I wanted to unravel the obvious originality of Hegel's and Marx's positions concerning anthropological and political issues. The evident differences notwithstanding, I considered it relevant to join them in the same