Kant's Faulty

(1) Reason as a faulty

The explanation of in what sense the reason is a faculty is required a bit elucidation with other faculties in human’s mind. Kant himself divided the mind’s power into three basic faculties: cognition or knowledge, feeling, desire. Wood reads the Kant’s version of three faculty as those powers that are working together. This is most obvious when the faculty of desire operates as mental process. Wood writes in this regard:

Kant defines the faculty of desire (Begehrungsvermögen) as the capacity to produce an object (or state of affairs) by means of a representation (Vorstellung) of that object (KpV 5:9, MS 6:211). To desire an object (or state of affairs) is to have a representation of it accompanied by a feeling of pleasure.

This feature is the most fundamental normative act in Kant’s theory. Setting ends means submitting to the self-discipline of performing or doing the actions, which are called means, through the progress of judging by choosing and deciding the suitable ways to achieve the final purpose or ends or goals or state of affairs as a good thing to follow. In other expression, it is kind of freedom, but when it levels up in term of activity it expresses in the notion of reason as faculty or will or practical reason in Kant’s

This radical egalitarianism, grounded in the conception of every human being as a rationally self-governing agent, is the most fundamental idea in Kantian ethics. The potential of this Kantian idea to transform our relations with one another is still pitifully far from being realized, or its implications even properly thought out consistently.

And this is, of course, one of the most greatest conclusion which one can point out in Kant’s critical philosophy. As Wood