What Was The Primary Reason For Ww2 Essay

This investigation will answer the question “What was the primary reason for Japan’s Surrender in World War 2?” The following sources have two different perspectives: The use of nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the cause of Japanese surrender, and the crumbling military was the primary reason for Japanese Surrender. Source one is an article written by Sadao Asada titled “The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan’s Decision to Surrender: A Reconsideration,” published in 1998 in the academic journal Pacific Historical Review. This source’s origin is valuable because the author, Sadao Asada, received a phD in Japanese History from Yale University, was awarded the Edward S. Miller History Prize, and contributed to many books and articles

With the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, the naval blockade around Japan, as well as the imminent invasion of the Japanese homeland, the bombs created an “extremely favorable opportunity to commence peace talks” during a time where the government was split between surrendering and continuing to fight. More importantly, the destruction in Hiroshima and Nagasaki had a deep psychological impact on Emperor Hirohito, which pushed him to advocate for surrender within the Japanese government. Hirohito even declared, “No matter what happens to my safety, we should lose no time in ending the war so as not to have another tragedy like this.” As the emperor, Hirohito had major influence within the Japanese government, and his calls for peace were very important in facilitating Japan’s surrender. Grunow and Asada put an emphasis on the inner politics of the Japanese government; showing the vital role the atomic bombs had on influencing Hirohito to initiate Japan’s surrender. However, both Grunow and Asada neglect to examine the Japanese government’s opinion on surrendering in the days leading up to the atomic bombs, so it cannot be

Pape asserts that the atomic bombings were not the primary reason for Japanese surrender. According to Pape, The atomic bombs were devastating to civilian life and infrastructure; however, the atomic bombs killed about 1/7 of the people that are killed in conventional incendiary bombing. Furthermore, the atomic bombs were not used to their greatest potential. The timing between atomic attacks was too short, Japan couldn’t fully analyze the nature of the bomb and the scope of destruction. Pape also argues that because the atomic bombs weren’t used to their full potential, the atomic bombs were not the main cause of Japanese surrender-the failure of its army and logistics were. This is corroborated by Bernstein who asserts that the ongoing naval blockade of Japan would have starved the country into submission, and the atomic bombs were not necessary for Japan’s surrender. In comparison to Asada, Bernstein and Pape do not explore the psychological impacts of the atomic bomb, failing to consider the role of the atomic bomb impacted the resolve of the Japanese government. By the summer of 1945, Japan was unable to get supplies because the Allies imposed a naval blockade around Japan which greatly reduced their military and economic capability to support the war. When