Grey’s Anatomy Grey’s Anatomy is a drama/romance medical TV series. In the medical drama episode “Happily Ever After?”, this episode explores the complex world of medical decision-making where Doctors are faced with a critical choice regarding the resuscitation of Maxine, a patient closely related to one of the hospital’s Residency Doctors. The two Doctors are faced with a decision that could end their career if they take the wrong steps. The scenario revolves around the pivotal decision of whether to resuscitate a DNR (Do Not Resuscitate) and a DNI (Do Not Intubate) patient or not. The survey takes place when the patient Maxine stops breathing and results in her being coded in the hospital bed. Dr. Kawn, is already present with the patient …show more content…
Kahn will be resuscitating and intubating the patient himself, putting the patient in a harmful way, but if Levi helps, he will intubate Maxine. The outcome for the patient depends on the actions of Dr. Kawn and Dr. Levi. Dr. Kawn’s strategy of resuscitating Maxine despite her DNR and DNI directives reflects a decision influenced by his emotions and a potential willingness to face consequences for saving her life. For Dr. Levi, his strategy involves whether to help Dr. Kawn or not. Choosing to help means intervening against orders, but has the possibility to save Maxine. Maxine’s strategy is implicit in her DNR and DNI directives. Payoffs for this game can be ranked based on each situation. If both Dr. Kawn and Dr. Levi both decide to save Maxine’s life, then they would get the highest utility outcome of 3, reflecting the optimal scenario where Maxine’s life is saved with shared responsibility. However, if Dr. Kawn only saves Maxine then he will enjoy a utility of 2 and Dr. Levi with a 1, resulting in him saving Maxine but with potential consequences. If they both decide to do nothing and adhere to Maxine’s DNR and DNI, they will get the lowest payoff of 1. The tree for this game is shown in Figure …show more content…
Kawn, and Dr. Levi. Taking this into two parts, starting at the end of the tree. The second part focuses on Dr. Kawn and Dr. Levi’s choices, realizing that if Dr. Kawn decides to save Maxine by himself, it will result in a confined outcome for Dr. Levi. We see that Dr. Levi’s strategy would be to choose to help rather than not to because 3 is a greater payoff than 1. Now that we are left with two options for Dr. Kawn to help or to not help, comparing the payoff of 3 and 1, we know that Dr. Kawn’s strategy would be to choose 3, resulting in him helping. In this game, the rollback equilibrium reflects the decision Dr. Kawn and Dr. Levi chose in the analysis. Dr. Kawn’s initial decision to resuscitate Maxine triggers a cascade of actions. As we work backward through the game tree, the rational choice for Dr. Levi becomes apparent- to help Dr. Kawn in the absence of the chief or other doctors, resulting in Maxine’s stabilization. The rollback equilibrium, in this context, reflects a mutual understanding between the players that colluding is the optimal strategy here, emphasizing the importance of a collective commitment to Maxine. Based on my analysis of the scenario, it does coincide with the results that happened in the show, too. The rollback equilibrium reflects (Help, Help). This is the most logical option for both Dr. Kawn and Dr. Levi, even