Why Did The Schlieffen Plan Fail

The Schlieffen Plan is one of the first military plans people learn about when studying World War I. Despite, the plan being common knowledge to individuals who have studied Western military, there is much controversy over why the plan failed for the Germans. In recent decades the main question over Schlieffen’s war plan, whether the plan was meant to be used as a military strategy or not. For, the reunification of Germany in 1989, document that were once lost are now resurfacing, and with more information, there are more arguments about the reason the Schlieffen Plan failed. The recent argument on why the Schlieffen Plan failed was because Schlieffen had been not creating a military plan to follow for war and destroy the French military in

In the draft, which Schlieffen created, he also outlined how the Germans were to mobilize across the French border. The mobility, which was required to fulfill the Schlieffen Plan, was unrealistic, and had the plan been made, as a war plan, then Schlieffen would have created realistic goals and possible outcomes had part of mobilization failed. The success of the strategy Schlieffen created in 1905, relied heavily on quick mobilization, in which the execution and deployment of the plan were executed within a forty-two days. The railway system, which allowed high-capacity travel, offered the German army to head to battle at the pace Schlieffen had planned. Since, the Imperial German army was heading to battle through the railway system, then the Germans were tied towards a vulnerable form of transportation. Schlieffen was aware of the problems of relying on the railway system towards his plan; nonetheless he did not create a solution. Schlieffen was the General of the German Army, which meant he knew the risks of not creating alternative solutions, or ways to fix a highly likely problem, in a war plan. Thus, the conclusion can then be made that Schlieffen was not creating a war strategy, but a rough draft of how to defend the Germans against France and

Gross is one of many Historians who argue that Schlieffen planned to plan, say that the Germans were to have annihilated the French in 30 to 40 days. The concept that there could be a quick battle of annihilation in France is ridiculous. The map which outline the Schlieffen plan states it takes the German army thirty-one days to march to the Somme, the north of Paris. The time it would take to march around Paris and then through Switzerland would have been even longer, from six to eight weeks. The Germans would then have to foot-march back to the railheads in Germany. According to the 1914 Aufmarschanweisungen, the Germans had the rail capacity to move seven corps at once, thus moving even part of the army towards the eastern would take weeks. Even if everything went according to plan, the Schlieffen plan would have taken four or five months. In two or three months the Russians could have deployed 110-120 divisions against nine German and forty Austrian divisions. Prior to what Historians believed, the Schlieffen plan could not have provided a quick victory against France and Russia. Since, the Schlieffen plan could not provide a quick victory, meant that the plan was inoperable because Russia and France would mobilize their armies fast enough to attack a helpless