Collective Bargaining Case Summary

See id. § 151; see also J.I. Case Co., v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 339 (1944)(noting that the majority rule principle of the NLRA “collectivizes the employment bargain . . . .”). See Schwab, supra note 70, at 254 (noting that the NLRA is premised on capitalism, private bargaining, and the economic strength of the parties); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension Between Individual Employment Rights And The New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 578, 589–90 (1992) (observing that market factors such as efficiency and profitability control and insulate the employer’s bargaining obligation).
138A See Emmett P. O’Neill, The Good Faith Requirement in Collective Bargaining, 21 MONT. L. REV. 202,

GETMAN, RESTORING THE POWER OF UNIONS at 229-30 (2010) (observing that the strike weapon was a power equalizer under the NLRA but this weapon was neutralized by the judicial determination that employers may permanently replace strikers); Div. 1282 Amalgamated Ass’n of St., Elec. Ry. And Motor Coach Emps. Of Am. Business Employees v. Missouri, 374 US 74, 82 (1963) (finding that the right to strike is at the “core” of collective bargaining); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 US 221, 234 (1963) (finding that the strike is “an economic weapon which in great measure implements and supports the principles of the collective bargaining system.”). See AIDT & TZANNATOS, supra note 15, at 56–58; Zimmer, supra note 5851, at 1547 (citing the auto industry as an example where this practice worked in the past). See id.; see also Fried, supra note 62, at 1030 (noting that with government protection or regulation employers could pass union premiums on to consumers). See Renae Broderick &and Barry Gerhart, Non-Wage Compensation, in David Lewin, Daniel J.B. Mitchell, and Mahmood A. Zaidi, eds., 3 THE HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK, PART III, 95-135 145–73 (David Lewin, Daniel J.B. Mitchell & Mahmood A. Zaidi, eds., 1997); see also FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 11, at 181–84 (concluding that unions lower profitability and that the benefits of unionism do not offset union

Bednarek, The Gender Wage Gap: Searching for Equality in A Global Economy, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 213, 217 (1998) (stating that structural changes resulting from globalization usher in a more flexible workforce with reduced labor regulations and costs that ultimately devalue labor). The effects of structural changes in the economy and wage competition from foreign workers were already noticeable over a quarter of a century ago. See Abner J. Mikva, The Changing Role of the Wagner Act in the American Labor Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1131-–32 (1986). Bednarek, supra note 246, at 217 (stating that structural changes resulting from globalization usher in a more flexible workforce with reduced labor regulations and costs that ultimately devalue labor). Global wage competition has combined with a stockholder primacy culture to put downward pressure on wages for most workers while promoting the interests of senior managers. See Susan J. Stabile, One For A, Two For B, And Four Hundred For C: The Widening Gap In Pay Between Executives And Rank And File Employees, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 115, 118 (2002) (identifying shareholder primacy philosophy as the cause of the dramatic disparity between executive pay and that of other workers). See also Estlund, supra note 65, at 950 (noting that product market competition has increased with globalization and this has encouraged employers to pursue a low-wage strategy); Fried, supra note 62, at 1030 (observing that the