The Pros And Cons Of Nuclear Weapon Proliferation

For several years Nuclear energy has been taken as a danger since it has caused several catastrophic events due to its inappropriate use. Although these events look pretty disastrous they have not killed as many people as our current methods of generating energy have. To understand these concept in a better way it is important to know the basic science and history of nuclear energy. As well as why some people fear that nuclear energy means nuclear weapon proliferation and that the risks of using nuclear energy out wage its benefits. Because nuclear energy is a relatively new and unexplored field, many people have generated unjustified fears and anxieties by relating it specifically to nuclear catastrophes.

The science on which nuclear energy

Nuclear technology made a very violent entrance into the world. Just after the first nuclear bomb test explosion in 1944, two large cities were completely destroyed by two single nuclear bombs. After this, nuclear power plants slowly evolved with the main purpose of producing electricity although they have always been intimately connected with nuclear weapon technology. It is almost impossible to generate nuclear weapons without access to the nuclear power plants. Many countries are highly interested in generating atomic weapons even though it is not legal, “The spread and growth of nuclear arsenals are linked in a political chain reaction. That is, proliferation has spurred further proliferation” (Ferguson 104). For these reason safeguards have been created in order to prevent this nuclear weapon proliferation and a future nuclear war. The safeguards are supposed to make sure that nuclear plants are not being used to generate nuclear weapons, although it is really hard to tell: “Safeguarding declared reactors is relatively easy to do because, when visiting these reactors, it is possible to count discrete items such as spent fuel assemblies and the large and thus highly visible character of these items. In comparison, safeguarding fissile material-handling facilities such as enrichment and reprocessing plants is much harder to do because these facilities are moving around large amounts of bulk materials over considerable lengths of piping and other pieces of equipment. So, such facilities tend to have materials unaccounted for, and thus raise the possibility of diversion of one or more bombs’ worth of fissile material” (Ferguson 125). The most important factor preventing the safeguards to work properly is the “international political pressure and how particular nations perceive their long-term security interests in relation to their immediate neighbours” (Cobb). Therefore, the